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The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 and
Commission Payments to Agents in Export
Transactions
by Edward E. Dyson*
I. Introduction
Over the past few years there has been much publicity concerning
the disclosure by many U.S. corporations of payments to foreign officials
to secure favorable business treatment. The Securities and Exchange
Commission (the "SEC") initiated the Voluntary Disclosure Program in
which some 400 companies under SEC jurisdiction participated. Such
disclosures supposedly would satisfy the main goal of the SEC, namely,
to insure that companies adequately accounted to their shareholders for
all off-the-book funds and payments relating to dealings with foreign
governments.
We have seen, however, from recent developments that voluntary
disclosure was not enough to satisfy both the SEC and the Department of
Justice. The latter is currently investigating those companies that volun-
teered to disclose for purposes of determining if criminal violations exist.
Since the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 19771 (the "FCPA") was not
in force at the time that many of the activities which are being investi-
gated took place, the Justice Department has resorted to the use of the
Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act,2 and the Mail and
Wire Fraud statute 3 in bringing actions against companies.
The FCPA consists primarily of two parts. The first, 4 and to some
the most significant part, imposes substantial accounting standards on
issuers subject to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 5 Under the sec-
* Member, Virginia and District of Columbia Bars; Partner, Baker & McKenzie; B.B.A.
1962, LL.B. 1966, George Washington University.
I Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977) (codified in scattered articles of 15 U.S.C. § 78,
reprinted tn 17 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 214 (1978).
2 31 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1062, 1081-1083, 1101-1105, 1121-1122 (1976). Sections 1058, 1059,
and 1103 provide the sanctions for noncompliance.
3 18 U.S.C. §§ 1134-1343 (1976). Sections 1341 and 1343 are applicable in this context.
4 Pub. L. No. 95-213, § 102, codified in 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m(b)2, 3 (1978 Supp.).
5 15 U.S.C. §-78 (1976).
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ond part,6 or corrupt payment section, issuers and other "domestic con-
cerns" not under SEC jurisdiction, are prohibited from making
payments to "foreign officials."
This speech will examine the main provisions of the FCPA includ-
ing its jurisdictional scope. It will then analyze what is perhaps the most
worrisome provision under the FCPA for most U.S. companies exporting
abroad, i.e., the "reason to know" requirement with respect to pay-
ments.7 Under this requirement the FCPA holds a U.S. company ac-
countable for payments made by a commission agent of a U.S. company
to a foreign official, even though the U.S. company did not have actual
knowledge of the payment but did have "reason to know" of it.
II. Federal Legislation
A. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977
1. Accounting Standards-Generally, a company under the ju-
risdiction of the SEC is required to maintain its records in reasonable
detail to reflect disposition of assets accurately.8 The obvious purpose of
the requirement is to prevent the creation of "off-the-books funds" that
may be used for making illegal payments. Issuers are also requiredto
establish internal accounting controls to insure that the transactions are
carried out under proper authorization and are properly recorded to ac-
count for assets adequately. 9 Access to assets also must be controlled. 10
The FCPA specifically includes an exception to the accounting
standards requirements on the basis of national security;1 that is, there
may be instances where companies are expressly excused from maintain-
ing records of certain assets, presumably used to establish slush funds, if
this practice is done at the direction of the U.S. government for national
security purposes. It is not quite clear how this provision would work. It
goes without saying that any issuer that attempts to come under this
provision should initially take all steps necessary to insure that the gov-
ernment cannot later take a contrary position, especially in view of the
aftermath of the Voluntary Disclosure Program.
Finally, there is some question as to whether the accounting stand-
ards apply to foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies. The SEC has taken
the position that they do, although this is not clear from the legislation
itself. If the SEC position is maintained, it would appear reasonable to
apply the requirements only to those foreign subsidiaries who materially
contribute to consolidated financial statements of a U.S. issuer.
It is important to note that the establishment of internal accounting
6 Pub. L. No. 95-213, §§ 103, 104, codified in 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78dd-1,2 (1978 Supp.).
7 Id § 103(a)(3), codified in 15 U.S.C.A. § 78dd-l(a)(3) (1978 Supp.).
8 Id § 102(2)(A), codified in 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m(b)(2)(A) (1978 Supp.).
9 Id § 102(2)(B)(i), (ii), codified in 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m(b)(2)(B)(i),(ii) (1978 Supp.).
10 Id § 102(2)(B)(iii), codified in 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m(b)(2)(B)(iii) (1978 Supp.).
11 Id § 102(3)(A), codified in 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m(b)(3)(A) (1978 Supp.).
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controls may have a significant bearing on the "reason to know" stan-
dard with respect to payments made to foreign officials by the commis-
sion agents of U.S. exporters. If, for example, internal controls have been
established and if pursuant to such controls commission payments are
closely monitored and nothing out of the ordinary becomes apparent,
then this may contribute to a finding that the U.S. exporter does not
have reason to know of an illegal payment actually made out of such
commissions.
2. Corrupt Payments
a. Jurisdicton-The FCPA prohibits corrupt payments
to foreign officials. The SEC and the Justice Department share the re-
sponsibility for enforcement of the FCPA. The SEC has jurisdiction with
respect to any issuer who has registered securities pursuant to Section 12
of the Securities Exchange Act of 19 3 4 i2 or who is required to file reports
under Section 15(d).1 3 This enforcement responsibility also extends to
any officer, director, employee or agent of an issuer, or any stockholder of
the issuer acting on its behalf. 14
The Department of Justice has enforcement responsibility over any
other "domestic concern" that is not an issuer subject to the jurisdiction
of the SEC. 15 A "domestic concern" under the FCPA means any indi-'
vidual who is a United States national or any resident of the United
States, or any corporation, partnership, association, joint stock company,
business trust, incorporated organization or sole proprietorship which
has its principal place of business in the United States or which is orga-
nized under the laws of a state of the United States.16
The FCPA does not extend to foreign subsidiaries of domestic con-
cerns. 17 The legislative history specifically recognizes the jurisdictional
difficulty inherent in attempting to enforce the provisions of the FCPA
with respect to the activities of foreign subsidiaries.18
On the other hand, the legislative history recognizes that a domestic
concern may be closely involved in an international transaction carried
out by its foreign subsidiary and that this involvement itself may subject
the domestic concern to liability.i9 Accordingly, the exclusion of foreign
subsidiaries may not be as significant as first thought. Very seldom does
a domestic concern completely divorce itself from the activities of a for-
eign subsidiary. If, for example, a foreign subsidiary, as a matter of rou-
12 Pub. L. No. 95-213, § 103(a), codified in 15 U.S.C.A. § 78dd-l(a) (1978 Supp.).
13 Id
14 Id
15 Id § 104, codified in 15 U.S.C.A. § 78dd-2 (1978 Supp.).
16 Id. § 104(d)(1), codified in 15 U.S.C.A. § 78dd-2(d)(1) (1978 Supp.).
17 Id by omission.
18 S. REP. No. 114, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1977). The Senate version of the bill was
passed; see also the conference reports H.R. REP. 831, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. REP.
95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. REP. 640, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
19 S. REP. No. 114, supra note 18, at 11.
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tine, requests authorization from its U.S. parent to proceed with
transactions and those transactions involve unreasonable commissions,
acquiescence by the U.S. parent may make it liable under the FCPA.
Furthermore, although foreign subsidiaries are not covered, individuals
who are U.S. residents, citizens or nationals will be liable when they act
in relation to the affairs of any foreign subsidiary of a U.S. company.
The legislative history clearly indicates that employees (other than
officers, directors or stockholders acting on behalf of the company) and
agents of a domestic concern or issuer cannot be found liable unless the
company is also found liable.20 The purpose of this requirement is to
insure that a low-level employee or other agent of the company is not
made the scapegoat for the corporation. This provision is intended to
insure that the agent or employee has an adequate legal defense by utiliz-
ing some of the resources used by the issuer or domestic concern in its
own defense.
The SEC and the Justice Department are encouraged in the legisla-
tive history to cooperate closely in the development of a uniform enforce-
ment program.2 ' The SEC's responsibilities extend to conducting
investigations, bringing civil injunctive actions and commencing admin-
istrative procedures. The Justice Department retains sole investigative
and prosecutorial jurisdiction over domestic concerns. In all cases, re-
sponsibility for criminal prosecution rests with the Justice Department.
This unusual division of enforcement responsibility may confuse
those companies attempting to comply with the FCPA and most cer-
tainly will give rise to different interpretations with respect to permissible
activities. For example, the President recently issued a statement, in-
tended to liberalize export policies, which included a directive to the Jus-
tice Department to issue guidelines under the FCPA. To date, however,
both the Justice Department and the SEC have remained tightlipped
and have refused to provide any guidance whatsoever. This, of course,
has left companies in a very uncertain state, and exporters, when in
doubt, have tended to refrain from doing business, to the detriment of
our balance of payments problem.
b. fohibitions-Under criminal penalty, the FCPA pro-
hibits issuers, domestic concerns or any officer, director, employer, or
agent of issuers or domestic concerns from making use of the mails or any
instrumentality of interstate commerce corruptly in furtherance of an of-
fer, payment, or promise to pay anything of value to anyfore'gn official, any
foreign political party or any candidate for foreign political office, or any
person, while knowing or having reason to know that a payment will be
made to a foreign official, political candidate, etc., in order to obtain, retain
20 Id
21 d. at 12.
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or diect business to anyperson.22 All of the above elements are necessary for
a conviction under the FCPA.
(i) Corruptly-As set forth in the legislative his-
tory, 23 the payment must be intended to induce the recipient to misuse
his official position in order to wrongfully direct business to the payor or
his client or to obtain beneficial legislation or a favorable regulation for
him. The term "corruptly" connotes an "evil motive" or purpose but it
does not require that the act be fully consummated or succeed in produc-
ing the desired outcome. The required intent may be inferred from all of
the surrounding facts and circumstances.
Thus, persons subject to the FCPA will be liable for payments made
with a corrupt intent. In addition, an individual who is a domestic con-
cern and any officer, director, stockholder (acting on behalf of an issuer
or domestic concern), employee or agent of an issuer or domestic concern
will be liable for willful violations of the prohibition against payments to
foreign officials (i.e., a realization that one is engaging in wrongful con-
duct and deliberate and intentional acts or omissions in connection
therewith).
(ii) Anything of Value-An actual payment is not
required. Offers of or promises to pay anything of value are covered.
The term "anything of value" is broad enough to include not only cash
payments or gifts of personal property but may include a request by the
foreign official that a friend or relative be appointed as agent in a partic-
ular transaction or that a contribution be made to a charitable organiza-
tion controlled by the official or to a family member. In general,
"anything of value" can be construed to mean any gain or advantage or
anything regarded by the beneficiary as a gain or advantage.
(iit) Business Purpose-In order to come within the
prohibitions of the FCPA, the payment made to a foreign official must
be for the purpose of assisting the payor in obtaining or retaining busi-
ness or in directing business to someone else, such as the payor's client.
In this context, payments to obtain favorable government contracts are
clearly covered. Likewise, payments to obtain preferential legislation
would be covered. A payment may also be prohibited where its purpose
is to increase the company's profits in a particular transaction, such as by
unauthorized tax payment reductions or a customs reclassification to a
lower duty.
These activities must be contrasted with facilitating payments (to be
discussed below) and distinguished from extortion situations. As illus-
22 Pub. L. No. 95-213, § 30A, 104, codified in 14 U.S.C.A. § 78dd-1,2 and § 78L (1978
Supp.).
23 Supra note 18, at 10.
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trated in the legislative history of the FCPA,2 4 a payment to an official to
keep an oil rig from being dynamited should not be held to be made with
the requisite corrupt purpose.
(iv) Foreign Offczi-A "foreign official" means
any officer or employee of a foreign government or of any department,
agency, or instrumentality thereof, or any person acting in an official
capacity for or on behalf of a foreign government or any department,
agency or instrumentality thereof. The definition does not include low-
level government employees whose duties are primarily ministerial or
clerical in nature. A government employee who has the discretionary
authority to award government contracts, however, is clearly a foreign
official for purposes of the FCPA.
A question exists as to whether state-owned businesses, such as East-
ern Bloc trading companies, are government instrumentalities. State-
owned trading companies, for all outward purposes, operate in essen-
tially the same manner as any other commercial establishment. Because
of the uncertain status of state-owned companies, however, U.S. compa-
nies are obliged to treat employees of those companies in a manner dif-
ferent from the way they treat employees of purely commercial
establishments. It may be acceptable to buy employees of state-owned
businesses a lunch during the course of a sales negotiation, but anything
that smacks of a corrupt payment should be avoided. 25
In some countries, a government employee can act in a private ca-
pacity as an agent. Care must be taken when dealing with such a person
to ascertain which hat he is wearing. The definition of a "foreign offi-
cial" is also broad enough to cover persons acting on behalf of the gov-
ernment, such as government consultants who may be in a position to
evaluate and recommend business proposals to the government. Another
questionable situation involves Middle East countries where many mem-
bers of the various royal families serve as commercial agents. Are these
persons foreign officials because of their royal affiliations? The legislative
history offers no explanation for the failure to answer these questions
and, to date, the Department of Justice and the SEC have been unwill-
ing to provide guidance in this area.
(v) Exclusions -- Commercial bribery is not cov-
ered by the FCPA, which is limited to payments of "foreign officials."
Facilitating payments, or so-called "grease" payments, are also excluded
under the FCPA. The statute excludes from its definition of foreign offi-
cial those employees whose duties are essentially ministerial or clerical.
The legislative history cites as examples of facilitating payments those
which are made for the purpose of expediting shipments through cus-
24 Id at 11.
25 Pub. L. No. 95-213, § 30A(b) and § 104(d)(2), codified in 15 U.S.C.A. § 78dd-1,2 and
§ 78L (1978 Supp.).
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toms, placing a transatlantic telephone call, securing required permits or
obtaining adequate police protection. 26 In all such cases, the duties are
properly performed, although perhaps performed in a more expeditious
manner. In contrast, however, a payment to a customs official made for
the purpose of fraudulently reclassifying commodities to a lower duty
classification would fall outside of the facilitating payments exclusion.
While the FCPA exempts such facilitating payments, at least one
Justice Department spokesman has not ruled out the possibility of
bringing an action under other Federal statutes (such as the Mail and
Wire Fraud statute) when such facilitating payments are made on a con-
tinuing basis, are extensive, have a significant effect on the business, and
are paid with the knowledge of top officials of the company.
B. Other Federal Statutes
The Justice Department has brought criminal enforcement actions
in the questionable payments area under the statute against making false
statements to the government, 27 the Currency and Foreign Transactions
Reporting Act 28 and the Mail and Wire Fraud statute. 29 The Currency
and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act requires a report from persons
carrying more than $5,000 in any monetary instrument to or from the
United States. Actions have been brought under the Mail and Wire
Fraud statute on the basis that payments made by a U.S. company in
violation of a local country's laws are a fraud perpetrated on the people
of that country. Moreover, the Internal Revenue Service is conducting
its own investigation of foreign payments. It asks a series of five ques-
tions, some of which are broader in scope than the prohibitions under the
FCPA.
III. Commission Payments to Agents
Undoubtedly, the section of the FCPA that is the most troublesome
to exporters is that which prohibits payments to others while knowing or
having reason to know that all or a portion of such payments will be paid
to a foreign official. Some authorities have contended that this reason-
to-know standard is too vague to support a criminal prosecution. Suffice
it to say, however, that companies will at least be required to take certain
steps and institute certain procedures designed to uncover situations
which, from outward signs, are out of the ordinary. While the legislative
history recognizes that companies cannot be responsible for agents who
run "amuck, '30 a conscious disregard of obvious signs puts the company
in a tenuous position.
26 Supra note 18, at 10.
27 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1948).
28 Supra note 2.
29 Supra note 3.
30 Supra note 18, at 11.
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One may posit an overly simplified hypothetical: a company may
have been dealing for some years with a particular agent who customa-
rily charges a five percent commission on the net invoice price to pur-
chasers in a foreign country. The seller desires to sell to a particular
government agency with which it has not done business before, and it
seeks the agent's assistance. The agent indicates that he can put the deal
together but, in a departure from previous practice, requests a ten per-
cent commission. Why the additional five percent? Is such increase in
commission, where the commission has been stable for years, a sign that
would give the company "reason to know" that a payment may be made
to a foreign official?
Several factors may provide the company with reason to know: size,
the services to be performed by the agent, the relationship of the agent to
the governmental buyer and the method of payment. The size of the
payment may be an indication that something is amiss. We have seen,
however, especially in transactions in the Middle East, that commissions
can be extremely high and exhorbitant. This, in itself, does not necessar-
ily mean that payments are being made to foreign officials. The com-
pany paying the commissions, however, should ascertain whether the
payments are substantially in excess of the going rate for similar services
in the particular country. The company should further ascertain
whether the country involved has regulations imposing a ceiling on the
commission rate for agents and, if so, whether that rate has been ex-
ceeded.
The nature and extent of the services rendered by the agent are sig-
nificant factors in determining whether a commission payment is reason-
able and justifiable. A comparison can be made between intermediation
services, that is, payment of a substantial fee to the agent merely for lo-
cating a customer, and conventional services, such as advertising and in-
stallation services usually provided by agents in the normal course of
selling a product. Payments for intermediation services are more suspect
than payments for conventional services rendered by an agent. It should
be noted, however, that intermediation services are clearly permissible in
many foreign jurisdictions. On the other hand, some countries do not
permit agents to act as intermediaries between a supplier and a govern-
mental purchaser. A company should take care to assure that the serv-
ices rendered by the agent are commensurate with the size of the
commission and the payment is, therefore, economically justifiable.
It goes without saying that the company should determine whether
the agent is in any way connected with the foreign government, either as
an employee or consultant. As mentioned earlier, a government official
is permitted under the laws of some countries to act as a private agent in
an individual capacity. For obvious reasons the company should exercise
extreme care under these circumstances.
An agent's direction to make payment to a third party, such as a
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bank outside of the country in which the agent resides, should also cause
the company to question the legality of the payment. By making such a
payment outside of the country the U.S. supplier may be aiding and
abetting a violation of the currency exchange controls or tax laws of the
agent's country. While this activity does not involve a payment to a for-
eign official, it may be actionable under the Mail and Wire Fraud statute
on the grounds that a fraud is being perpetrated on the government or
the people of the agent's country.
Another common payment practice is "overinvoicing." Under this
practice, the invoice prepared by the U.S. supplier shows the goods at a
higher price than the actual contract price. The higher price is paid by
the buyer and the difference between the actual price and the higher
price is held in reserve for the buyer for subsequent deposit in a foreign
bank of the buyer's choice. In this manner, the buyer is able to avoid his
country's currency controls or income tax laws. The U.S. supplier may
be liable under the Mail and Wire Fraud statute for aiding and abetting
the distributor in evading his country's laws and may also be liable for
misstatements in completing shipping declarations or license applications
required under U.S. export laws. Additionally, in the case of an issuer
subject to the jurisdiction of the SEC, such a practice may be in violation
of the accounting standards of the FCPA to the extent that the corporate
books fail to reflect the underlying transaction accurately.
These dealings with a commission agent should be distinguished
from dealings with a distributor. In most cases, title to the goods passes
to the distributor and he sells to third parties at his own discretion. He
generally acts independently. Absent evidence which shows that the dis-
tributor arrangement is merely a sham to enable the supplier to do some-
thing indirectly which he could not do directly, the supplier should not
in the normal course of action be responsible for the acts of the distribu-
tor.
A company can take steps to protect itself when dealing with an
agent by using contractual provisions that obligate the agent to refrain
from making payments to foreign officials, to comply with local laws, to
disclose to the U.S. supplier any instances when the agent is placed in a
compromising position and to forfeit commissions in the event of miscon-
duct on his part.
The company should check into the background of all agents it em-
ploys; such an investigation should include making credit checks and ob-
taining references from other companies using the agent.
Reasonableness of the commissions demanded by the agent should be
documented in light of the customary practice in the country involved
and in view of the .services rendered by the agent. In some circum-
stances, the U.S. supplier may resort to the opinion of local counsel with
respect to whether the agent is a foreign official, whether he is properly
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registered and whether the commission he is demanding is legally within
any limits that may be set under local law. Representations by company
employees in the field as to the trustworthiness and competence of an
agent would be helpful in completing the file on the agent.
Finally, the institution of internal accounting controls (regardless of
whether or not required) and board monitoring of any transactions that
may be material to the company are desirable. The use of all of the
foregoing procedures will be helpful in showing that the company had no
"reason to know" of the subsequently discovered illegal payments by an
agent to a foreign official.
In general, companies should adopt codes of conduct which set forth
the company policy of full compliance with U.S. laws relating to foreign
payments. They should request periodic certifications by key employees
and should conduct educational seminars and distribute memoranda ex-
plaining U.S. legislation governing such payments.
Question and Answer
Question: How would you counsel a client concerning payments to
officials of state-owned companies? What if a foreign subsidiary makes
the payment?
Mr. Dyson: Payment to a state-owned company may be a payment to
a foreign official, because a state-owned company is an instrumentality of
the government. Technically, payment by a foreign subsidiary is outside
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, however, the U.S. operation may be
considered to have acquiesced in the payment.
Question: Do you think that the U.S. government will take local cus-
tom into account when deciding to prosecute U.S. companies for ques-
tionable payments?
Mr. Dyson: I don't. The statute does not provide exemptions on a
territorial basis, so I assume that it will be enforced evenhandedly. There
is no exclusion based on the legality of payment under local law.
Question: How will the accounting procedures affect corporate struc-
ture? Will it cost more and will the SEC promulgate bookkeeping guide-
lines?
Mr. Dyson: Only companies under the jurisdiction of the SEC will be
affected, and most of these have been submitting financial statements to
the SEC for some time. The primary effect will be the institution of
internal controls designed to catch a flagrant payment to an official or a
large slush fund. The legislative history indicates that the company need
not spend more money on installing the internal controls than they
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are worth. The controls should be geared to the particular operation,
which will affect the corporate structure. There are various guidelines
which have been promulgated.
Question: Comment on the pitfalls of directing a foreign agent to de-
posit commissions in a Swiss bank.
Mr. Dyson: The problem here is one of aiding and abetting. Is the
agent avoiding the payment of income tax in his local jurisdiction? Is he
getting money out of the country illegally? By helping him are you com-
mitting a fraud on the government and thereby a fraud on the people?
There may be situations where this arrangement is merely a matter of
convenience and there are no problems. If no law is violated, there
should be no particular problem.

